Musings On Iraq

Iraqi Charcoal Workers

2012-02-10T10:06:00.001-08:00

In some parts of Iraq, charcoal is still made by hand. These are pictures of workers outside of Tikrit, the provincial capital of Salahaddin making charcoal. They work around 10 hours per day, and sell their sacks of charcoal for $3 each.

Man prepares a pit for a fire (Reuters)

Workers are laying down wood into the pit to start a fire for making a new batch of charcoal (Reuters)

Men shoveling through the embers (Reuters)

Two workers begin bagging the charcoal (Reuters)

With the process over, and the charcoal bagged, the only thing left is to put it on a truck to bring it to market (Reuters)

AL JAZEERA VIDEO: Domestic Violence Plagues Iraq

2012-02-10T10:06:00.000-08:00

EAME VIDEO: Khor Zubayr, Basra, Iraq

2012-02-10T10:05:00.006-08:00

EAME VIDEO: Wrecks Along The Khor Zubayr, Basra, Iraq

2012-02-10T10:05:00.005-08:00

EAME VIDEO: Khor Zubayr Port, Iraq

2012-02-10T10:05:00.004-08:00

EAME VIDEO: Former River Crossing And Shipwrecks On The Eastern Riverbank Of The Khor Zubayr, Basra, Iraq

2012-02-10T10:05:00.003-08:00

AFP VIDEO: Commerce Returns To Iran-Iraq Border River

2012-02-10T10:05:00.002-08:00

AP VIDEO: Iraq's Sadr Celebrates U.S. Withdrawal

2012-02-10T10:05:00.001-08:00

FOX NEWS VIDEO: Iraq "Sadr City Rally"

2012-02-10T10:05:00.000-08:00

American Negligence In Iraq, Or How The United States Failed To Plan For Securing The Country: Part One Of A Two Part Interview With Jerry Burke, Former Advisor To The Baghdad Police And Interior Ministry

2012-02-09T07:33:00.000-08:00

Jerry Burke in front of a destroyed Iraqi tank (Police Futurist)

In May 2003, Jerry Burke, who at the time was the head of the New England Institute of Law Enforcement Management, was asked if he would be interested in travelling to Baghdad to carry out an assessment of the Iraqi police. He took up the offer, and found a police force in utter disarray. Most of its officers had abandoned their posts, police stations were looted and burned, and the government was non-existent. The U.S. was wholly unprepared for such a situation. Instead of having a plan in place before the March 2003 invasion, Burke and his team found themselves analyzing the Iraqi police, so that a program could be put together to secure the country, which would take months to implement. The lack of adequate preparation set the stage for what Burke would face during his two tours in Iraq, first as part of a Justice Department Assessment Team in May 2003, then as an advisor to the Baghdad Police from May 2003 to June 2004, and finally as part of an assistance mission to the Iraqi Interior Ministry from March 2005 to February 2006. During those years, he found a U.S. government that lacked the commitment to truly rebuild Iraq, which undermined the transition from a dictatorship to a democracy that Burke and others were working on. In the process, the rule of law was never fully established in Iraq. Burke later went on to work in Palestine and Afghanistan, and is currently serving as an advisor with a foreign police force in the Middle East.

1. You spent two tours in Iraq. What were the dates for those, and what were your duties?

The first tour started as an assessment, and evolved into my becoming the Senior U.S. Advisor to the Baghdad Police Chief. That tour went from May 15, 2003 to June 22, 2004. The second tour began less than a year later with an assignment as a National Security Advisor to the Iraq Ministry of Interior, specifically the Deputy Minister for Police Affairs. That tour went from March 5, 2005 to February 22, 2006.

2. How did you end up being contacted to work in Iraq?

I was working as the Director of the New England Institute of Law Enforcement Management at Babson College under a contract with the New England Association of Chiefs of Police. A retired chief, working on a Security Sector Reform (SSR) project in Latin America, called and asked if I would be interested in going to Baghdad as part of the first U.S. Government combined Department of State/Department of Justice Assessment Team.

3. Before you went to Iraq were you aware of any of the pre-war planning for the Iraqi police?

Before accepting the first assignment I was only casually aware of any pre-war planning from U.S. TV news. I had no knowledge of any Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) or Security Sector Reform (SSR) planning until after I accepted the contract offer.

4. Richard Mayer of the Justice Department came up with one plan to bring in 5,000 international police to help with the Iraqis. The White House vetoed that idea, because it didn’t want responsibility for running post-war Iraq. Do you think that sort of set the stage for the problems that the U.S. would later face when it did end up occupying Iraq for the next several years, and had to rebuild the police?

I met Dick Mayer during some of the pre-deployment meetings, and became somewhat familiar with his plan. During the run-up to deployment there wasn't enough time to become thoroughly familiar with it. The Mayer Plan was based on, and an extrapolation, of the Civilian Police missions in the Balkans with consideration of the Iraqi situation as it was understood. Subsequently, during the first months of deployment I became more familiar with the Mayer Plan. In my opinion, the Mayer Plan would have been an excellent plan to start with. The Mayer Plan would have been expensive, and at the time, Spring 03, there was no funding in either the State Department or Justice Department for any DDR or SSR programs. Our first contract was only a two-month contract as funds were found and transferred from other State and/or Justice programs. If I recall correctly, I had 5 or 6 small contracts during my first, thirteen month, tour. The Mayer Plan would have required hundreds of millions of dollars that simply were not available. In the long run however, the Mayer Plan may have been cheaper and more effective.

5. You arrived in Iraq just after the government had fallen. What did Baghdad physically look like at the time? Was there still looting going on? What was the mood of the Iraqis that you met with?

Most of the major looting was over by the time I got there. The looting that was still going on was mostly for scrap metal and used office furniture. Most of the combat damage was very localized and limited to the targets themselves. The accuracy of our cruise missiles and guided bombs is amazing. One interpreter told me stories of going up on his roof to watch cruise missiles fly by and then turn toward their targets.

Most of the Iraqis I met - most of whom were police, government employees, and Iraqis who came to work for Coalition components - were cautiously optimistic to skeptical. Most had a wait and see attitude even while cooperating with us. Most were confused by the obvious lack of a post-war plan.

For the first few months, May through August 2003, the city was relatively quiet, and we had complete freedom of movement in Baghdad. I was able to visit many police stations, visited many Iraqi homes for dinner, and ate at many restaurants across the city. In August 2003, the Jordanian embassy was bombed twice, and then the United Nations HQ at the Canal Hotel in East Baghdad. Those were the first significant bombs of the insurgency.

6. How many people were in your team?

The US Criminal Justice Assessment Team consisted of 3 corrections executives, 6 police executives, about a dozen judicial officials such as former judges and prosecutors, and then some project managers, and office personnel. Through the course of the Summer and Fall of 2003, those numbers dwindled as individuals’ contracts expired. By October/November 2003, there were only 2 U.S. Police Advisors left in Baghdad. Additional Police Advisors did not arrive until December and January 2004. By June 2004, there were still less than 100 U.S. Police Advisors in country. At first, the Iraqis couldn't imagine how 6 police executives were going to reform the entire Iraqi Police Service in a country of 25 million people. Neither could we!

7. What were the major findings and recommendations of your assessment team?

I frequently joke, and say the Executive Summary of our assessment could simply have stated that, "the Iraqi Police need everything." Almost all of the police facilities including the eleven story Ministry of Interior building had been looted, ransacked, stripped of all doors, windows, furniture, electrical fixtures, and set on fire. In many places entire new facilities would need to be built. Almost all the former police vehicles had been stolen, often by the police themselves or destroyed. Almost all of their training under Saddam had been designed to defend and support the regime. Entire new recruit, supervisory, leadership, and specialized training curricula would need to be designed, developed, and delivered to thousands of policemen across the entire country.

8. Were you happy with that early report?

Yes, I thought the report was professional and thorough, especially for the harsh and dangerous conditions under which it was written, and I am proud to have contributed to it.

9. How much of that report was acted upon?

The most important recommendation of the report, the size of the international police advisory mission was totally ignored. Everything else was dependent upon having the human assets available to do the work. Whether the decision not to follow that recommendation was made by Paul Bremer, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld or President George W. Bush himself is irrelevant - the administration failed to fulfill its responsibilities.

10. Do you think sending in an assessment team rather than trainers and advisers right away was a problem for the U.S. plans for Iraq’s police?

Sending just an Assessment Team was simply a delaying tactic for political inaction. The Assessment Team produced a report very similar to the Mayer Plan. Paul Bremer and others dramatically slashed the Assessment Team’s recommendations, down to a total recommended advisory contingent of 1,500 people. No more than 1,000 were to be Americans. The revised Assessment then formed the basis of a budget request sent to Congress. A supplemental budget to fund these advisors was passed by Congress in October 2003 five months after the Assessment Team arrived in Baghdad. The first group of 15 advisors arrived in December and another 24 in January 2004. By then we were so far behind the curve of the insurgency and Coalition mismanagement that it was impossible to catch up.

11. Just after you got to Iraq, Bernard Kerik, the former New York City police commissioner was placed in charge of rebuilding the Iraqi police. Did he achieve anything or was that all for show?

Bernie arrived a few weeks after we did and, from my perspective of working the streets of Baghdad and visiting several police stations every day, his impact was minimal. At first, his image as the "Police Commissioner of 9-11" grabbed everyone’s attention. What influence he had on Paul Bremer (CPA Administrator) I don't know, but things didn't get better during his brief three months in Baghdad. The few times I encountered him in the Republican Palace in the Green Zone he was accompanied by a New York Times reporter. The impression I got was that his time in Baghdad was just to pad his resume.

12. What was the state of the Iraqi police under Saddam before the U.S. invasion?

The Iraqi Police Service was a typical military style organization with enlisted men and an officer corps. The officers were very proud of their heritage going back to a British style constabulary with a British Commissioner seconded from England prior to Saddam and the Ba'ath Party. Under Saddam and the Party, the police were gradually relegated to a lesser and lesser role as a variety of security agencies were created to protect the regime. Eventually, there would be nearly twenty such security agencies. During the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi Police became a refuge from military service against Iran for educated and politically connected Iraqis. All of the officers I met had the equivalent of at least a bachelor's degree. Many had been educated or trained outside Iraq especially in former communist countries in Eastern Europe. By the time of the invasion in the spring of 2003, fear of encounters with other more powerful security agencies had led the police to adopt somewhat of a Fire Department attitude. That is, they were reluctant to leave the police stations unless directed by a judge or called by another agency for support.

When we first visited the Police Academy in east Baghdad’s Rusafa District it had been totally looted and ransacked. Among the debris in some of the buildings, nearly a foot deep in some places, we found copies, English language copies, of FBI Law Enforcement Bulletins, a monthly official FBI publication. As we talked with the commanders in Baghdad we found they were eager to try to return to what they considered the 'glory days' of policing circa 1940s and 50s.

13. Were former police officers allowed to return to their jobs?

In the early days, thousands of men arrived at the Baghdad Police Academy to return to duty. There was no way we, nor the U.S. Military Police (MP) could confirm that any of these men had been police officers before the war. There were no rosters of former policemen, and even if there were, they would have been in Arabic. The MPs had only a few Iraqi-American translators that could not be spared to review scattered documents and our team came in without any translators with the expectation of hiring local English speaking Iraqis. There simply were not enough American soldiers or civilian advisors to properly sort through the chaos. Remember, our original and primary mission was to conduct an assessment of the police and the criminal justice system, not to stand up a new Iraqi Police Service at that point in time.

A few English speaking Iraqi men we believed (hoped) were former policemen helped sort through the confusion of thousands of former policemen returning to work. Under Saddam, the police wore military uniforms where only the rank insignia was a different color. Transfers between the military, the police, and other uniformed agencies were common under Saddam. Undoubtedly, some former military or intelligence officers returned to work as police without our knowledge. Gradually, the remnants of the Baghdad Police returned to work, and a semblance of a police department began to form. Credit for this in Baghdad goes solely to the 18th Military Police Brigade and its Commanding Officer, Colonel Teddy Spain.

(An interview with Col. Ted Spain can be read here)

14. Was their any vetting of these returnees? Why or why not?

Very little vetting of the returning police was done. The priority was to stand up a new Iraqi Police Service (IPS), and let the Iraqis sort out the problems later. We were forced to rely upon Iraqis we learned to work with and to trust. There were no official documents that survived the looting and burning. Men returning presented old, poor quality identification cards, with old faded photographs, presumably of them when they were perhaps ten years younger. Occasionally, some officers would approach us and identify other men who they claimed were not real policemen. Whether these were legitimate complaints or personal vendettas was difficult to determine.

Iraqi police at a graduation ceremony in Feb. 2012 (Reuters)

15. How about for the new recruits, was their background checks, etc.?

Again, the priority was to stand up a new national IPS consisting of thousands of policemen. The initial goal in Baghdad was a force of 18,000 policemen. We, and by that I mean mostly the U.S. military across Iraq, would be forced to rely upon local, trusted Iraqis to verify and vouch for new recruits. Some recruitment standards such as height and weight were easy to verify, but other standards such as criminal background check, educational qualifications, and even someone's age were nearly impossible to verify. Local, sometimes self-identified community and religious leaders were used to help with this process. One story that I never had the time to confirm was that a new recruit sent to the Baghdad Airport to be sent to Jordan for training was discovered to have an artificial leg. Again, the attitude was to stand up a new IPS, and let the Iraqis sort it out later.

16. Do you have any rough numbers on how many Iraqi police were on duty by the end of 2003?

I don't recall exactly, and the answer would depend on the definition of "on duty." There were probably 7,000-9,000 officers on the payroll in Baghdad. Who they were, where they worked, if they worked at all, was an Iraqi responsibility. The U.S. and Coalition military did not have enough men to conduct roll calls of the Iraqis. It almost sounds racist, but we were dealing with a homogeneous population of men with olive complexion, black hair, and a mustache. There were reportedly some men who were on the payroll under multiple names in different locations, and giving kickbacks to officers to keep their names on the payroll. Undoubtedly, there was a lot of nepotism, cronyism, and ghost employees throughout the IPS, but we did not have the resources or the time to investigate.

17. When the Iraqi police returned to their jobs they were facing an almost insurmountable situation in the country with the growing insurgency and the emergence of the militias. Can you give any first hand accounts of what that early period was like for the police?

At the beginning in the spring of 2003, the violence was scattered, and relatively low level. Sniping at U.S. and Coalition military, and Iraqi Police was common. There were some revenge and honor killings, kidnappings, torturing, and disappearances. Some police and government officials returning to work were assassinated. One colonel that worked with us was at a restaurant having coffee with friends when a man walked up to him, called him by name, and shot him three times killing him. During our first week in Baghdad, our hotel was the target of almost nightly harassing sniping. One afternoon while working on the mezzanine level of the hotel, I learned that I could still do the low crawl as our hotel was shot at around 2 o'clock in the afternoon. By September 2003, almost every Iraqi Police station had been the target of a serious attack by either small arms fire (AKs usually), rockets, mortars or car bombs. This would continue during the winter and into the spring and summer of 2004, and on into the insurgency in 2005 -2007.

18. Your group recommended 6,600 foreign advisers and trainers for the Iraqi police, but that never happened, why?

I suspect the reasons were several. First, the costs would have been very high. In 2003, there was very little money available for anything other than the military. The reputed dispute between Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell was also a significant factor. It appeared to us 'outsiders', civilian contractors, that career State Department officials were not going to 'play' in Iraq, and perhaps even wanted the Defense Department to fail. Even if the Assessment Report had been accepted in its entirety, it would have taken perhaps two years to fully implement. Recruiting, vetting, training, and deploying a contingent that large is no easy task. The political decision to transfer sovereignty to the Iraqis by June 2004, while very shortsighted, was a political expediency. The U.S. was not prepared - militarily, politically, strategically, tactically or psychologically for the commitment to rebuild Iraq as a true democracy. This was blatantly obvious with the structure of the Interim Iraqi Government drawn along sectarian lines by the Coalition under Bremer. We aided and abetted the ethnic tensions that emerged during the insurgency.

19. At most there were around 900-1000 American trainers for the Iraqi police, what were their main duties?

Most of the U.S. trainers functioned as Mobile Training Teams visiting police stations and other facilities, and conducting short in-service training programs. Others were assigned directly to a regional police academy. In many areas, the Mobile Teams lived on military Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), and were under the direct control of the U.S. military commander. For a variety of reasons, including operational security, most teams were outside the wire only 2 or 3 days a week, and limited to visiting 1 or 2 stations per day. A Mobile Team might have 20 or more police stations assigned to it, which meant they might only be able to visit a given police station once or twice a month. Especially, when you factor in individual's leave, Fridays as the Muslim equivalent of Sundays as a day off, various U.S. and Christian holidays (there are Iraqi Christians), and various Islamic holidays. Ramadan itself is 28 days long, and very few Iraqis or Muslims work more than a few hours in the daytime. There are two Eids or multi-day feasts, Eid al Fitr, immediately following Ramadan, and Eid al Adha that are sort of a combination of Easter, Thanksgiving, and Christmas. Then every meeting begins with an extended period of pleasantries and obligatory cups of chai, coffee or occasionally, an orange soda. It is considered rude to immediately begin talking about professional issues. For security reasons, most visits were unannounced to avoid ambushes, and attacks if the meeting was scheduled in advanced. With unannounced visits, you never knew who, if anyone, was going to be at the police station when you arrived. Some teams would go into lock-down for a week or two after a series of attacks in their area. Much of the training was uncoordinated and improvised, depending upon the situation-on-the-ground where each Team operated. In some situations, Mobile Teams would be pulled from their primary duties to provide security for other Teams.

20. How did the lack of trainers affect the overall program to rebuild the Iraqi police?

In my opinion, after nearly eight years in the region, the Mobile Teams were effective when properly deployed - unfortunately, that was a rare occasion. That being said, the Mobile Teams were much more effective on a one-for-one basis than the military. What the military had, that the civilian trainers didn't have, was seemingly unlimited manpower. If necessary, the military could dedicate a squad or platoon into an area or to solve a problem. For example, there were more Military Police, not counting other military personnel, in Baghdad, at times by a factor of 2 or 3, than there were civilian trainers in all of Iraq. While many of the enlisted military personnel were young and inexperienced they made up for it in quantity.

6,000 civilian trainers would have been much more effective than 20,000 - 30,000 military personnel.

21. Did these trainers have any knowledge of Iraq and the situation they were heading into? How did that affect their work?

Many of the civilian trainers (40-50%?) had previous international training experience in the Balkans, East Timor or Haiti. But almost none of them had any experience in an Arab/Muslim country. And, again, almost none had any experience in a hostile, non-permissive, combat environment. A stateside training program was developed, but it focused more on medical exams and firearms qualifications. Specific knowledge of Iraq was rare and came mostly from U.S. television or an individual's own initiative to Google it.

22. Were the Iraqis consulted about the American plans for the police? How do you think that affected things?

At the beginning, and for quite awhile, there was no American plan, so, "No", the Iraqis were not consulted about "The Plan.” Much of the "Plan" came from individual's initiative (whether military or civilian) to adapt their prior training, education and, mostly, their experience to the Iraqi situation. A training program implemented at the Baghdad Police Academy might be totally different than programs implemented elsewhere in the country. For the first year or so, the Iraqi Police Commanders were gracious, understanding and even, sympathetic to the uncoordinated chaos in the whole reconstruction effort. By the time of the Transition to the Iraqi Interim Government in June 2004, the Iraqi Ministry of Interior was beginning to implement its own ideas of what the new police should look like. Unfortunately, most of these new government officials had no frame-of-reference for policing in a democracy. Their only concept of policing came from Saddam-era Iraq, or their time in exile in totalitarian countries like Iran and Syria.

23. The U.S. Institute of Peace issued a report in August 2003 that said there needed to be reform in Iraq’s legal system. Did the Americans ever attempt that, and how successful were they?

At the beginning, in May 2003, the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training, sent an assessment team along with us. The Judicial Team continued in Iraq, and formed a joint Iraqi-International Regime Crimes Liaison Office to prosecute Saddam and others. The Judicial Team was hampered by a lack of properly trained, educated, and qualified Iraqi lawyers and judges. Most - nearly, all - lawyers and judges had been compromised by the Saddam regime and were complicit in the regime's excesses. Furthermore, the new government wanted to install its prosecutors and judges most of whom were equally unqualified and willing to commit its own excesses in the name of justice - or at least, in the name of revenge.

24. Robert Perito from the Institute of Peace did an interview with PBS’ Frontline that aired in Oct. 03. He said that he didn’t think the U.S. was really committed to training the police. Did you feel that way yourself?

I know Bob Perito, and admire his work. The vast majority of the individuals that I met, whether military, U.S. government employees or civilian contractors, were dedicated and committed to their missions. The most frequent refrain that I heard was, "Is this the best that the American government can do?" To that point, the U.S. government, or more correctly, the Administration at that time was not committed to the police training mission or any other aspect of the reconstruction effort.

25. The training mission was originally supposed to be a civilian affair, but was taken over by the military. Why did that happen?

Neither the State Department nor the Justice Department had the inherent resources for a mission on the scale of Iraq. Neither had the management resources to plan, organize, and coordinate such a project. Neither had the life support capability or experience, not the air or ground transportation assets or even the communications capability to communicate in-country. All of these responsibilities would have to be contracted out, as some were, through normal U.S. government contracting procedures. For better or worse, the U.S. military is able to deploy thousands of personnel and hundreds of pieces of equipment and be operational in 24-48 hours.

26. You were deeply critical of this move, can you explain why.

The U.S. military did not, and still does not, have the capability and capacity or expertise to train, educate, and monitor a civilian, Rule-of-Law, ministerial (i.e., national) level criminal justice program. But, the military was on the ground in Baghdad early. State and Justice were not able to effectively deploy a significant number of civilian advisors and trainers for almost a year. There was a programmatic leadership vacuum, and the U.S. military does not tolerate leadership vacuums.

27. Jordan was eventually brought in to help as well. What was their role, and were they effective?

The impact of the war on Jordan was almost immediate and significant. Early in 2003, the increase in traffic to and from Jordan was dramatic. It seemed like dozens of auto-carrier trucks were coming into Baghdad from Jordan every day. The floodgates of commerce brought all kinds of modern consumer goods that had been previously banned. Particularly, electronic goods like mobile phones, satellite dishes, and computers. Traffic going into Jordan was mostly former regime officials fleeing from the Coalition, and the Shia militias. Even regular Iraqis who had been denied permission to leave Iraq were now leaving.

The security situation in Iraq became too dangerous to conduct police recruit training in-country so Jordan was selected. Jordan became the site of a large construction project to build an International Police Training Center known as JIPTC. Thousands of Iraqi recruits were in training at this facility at any one time for a period of about four years. I believe the capacity was about 4,000 recruits at one time. Today, JIPTC is still in use training other Arab recruits. A professional quality Jordanian police training cadre has been developed over the nearly ten years JIPTC has been operational.

28. In 2004, General Petraeus took over the Iraqi training mission. What did you think about his job?

General Petraeus was a larger than life figure during his tours in Iraq. Although he is not a trainer or educator by military specialty, he is a generalist, and an exceptional leader and manager to motivate others to perform to his expectations. Other generals, equally qualified by training, education and experience, failed in much less demanding positions.

29. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction recently issued an audit of the U.S. police training mission, and said one of the problems with the military running it was that each time a new unit rotated into Iraq they would basically start from scratch, which led to no consistency. Was that apparent while you were in Iraq?

That was a serious problem especially with the U.S. military more so than other nations. From discussions with U.S. military and civilians it appears that an Officer's Evaluation Report (OER) has a lot to do with it. Officers seem to get higher ratings if they initiate, innovate, create or otherwise show some leadership or more accurately, pseudo-leadership. This problem went right to the top of the military as each general tried to implement his ideas. This is further complicated by the aggressive, Can-Do military attitude where actions are often impulsive and not well thought out. No on in the U.S. military ever says to a superior officer, “No, we can’t do that,” even if that task is immoral, foolish, or just plain wrong.

A classic example of this was the police training in late 2003, especially police recruit training. There were less than 50 U.S. civilian police trainers in the country - most having arrived in December 2003. Recruiting standards and procedures were still being developed. Repairs had just begun at police academies around the country. The political decision had been made, ready or not, to transition governmental control to the Iraqis in June 2004, yet there was no functioning Ministry of Interior, and a barely functioning police department in Baghdad. Police academies were targets of frequent attacks, and the decision was made to train new recruits outside of Iraq in a controlled and safe environment. The decision was to build a new training center in Jordan. Construction began around October 2003, and the facility was barely functioning at a minimal capacity by January 2004. The Coalition Provisional Authority and the Department of Defense were frustrated with the slow pace of the police training program.

The U.S. military, then under the command of Lt. General Ricardo Sanchez, announced a plan to hire 30,000 new police recruits in 30 days. This plan was so impractical as to be ridiculous. It would be impossible to even forcibly round up 30,000 Iraqi men in 30 days. It would have been impossible to implement any recruitment standards at all. Even worse, there would have been no way to screen out potential insurgents and saboteurs.

Then it got even worse when they ran the number for the 30,000, the recruit training would still fall short of the military's goal. So they raised the numbers to 60,000 in 60 days! Double the foolishness.

30. Was the military the one that pushed for the creation of the paramilitary Iraqi National Police?

The Iraqi Police had always been a national force with standards, training, policy, and funding coming from the central government. But in reality there was decentralized control with provincial governors and mayors of larger cities exercising substantial local autonomy, as long as it didn't interfere with the regime's (Saddam's) plans. In one city, al-Hillah I believe, where the U.S. military appointed a new police chief, and the local mayor using his legal authority appointed a different police chief. Local officials, civic and police were reluctant to cooperate with the U.S. military beyond their local jurisdiction. The U.S. military needed a police force that it could deploy regardless of municipal or provincial boundaries. The response was to create two new police forces along European and U.S. models. The European model was a third force (special police) concept of an Iraqi gendarmerie or carabinieri along a more paramilitary and less civil, rule of law model. The U.S. model was an Iraqi Highway Patrol. The Highway Patrol was original designed to assist U.S. military units with convoy escort duties that crossed provincial boundaries.

Neither force fit within the Iraqi concept of policing nor within the Iraqi legal code. These two police forces would be problems for years. Of the two, the Special Police were the worst.

31. You were very critical of that move at the time, what was the basis of your complaints?

My opposition to these two new police forces was that they were accountable only to the U.S. military, and were often counter-productive to establishing a Rule-of-Law, criminal justice system in Iraq.

32. In 2004 the insurgents and Sadrists launched several major offensives. During each one of those there were reports that the Iraqi police abandoned their posts in several cities throughout the country. What was the reaction in Baghdad to that?

No civil, Rule-of-Law police agency anywhere is prepared for combat. The proper agency for that in the Iraqi context would have been the Iraqi Army, but we all know what Bremer did with the Army. The Iraqi Police were not trained or equipped for combat.

33. The response in the U.S. seemed to be that this was a sign of the failure of the U.S. to rebuild the Iraqi police. Did you agree with that?

No. Even in Northern Ireland, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) was not prepared for a military counter-insurgency role. The RUC would frequently assign one or two officers to patrol with a squad or more of British soldiers. No police should be prepared for a military counter-insurgency role. The failure was not in rebuilding the Iraq Police, the failure was the decision to disband the Iraqi Army - an overt political decision.

34. What was your impression of how the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) did things?

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was an unmitigated disaster. Many of the people in the CPA came with neo-conservative political agendas. I can't tell you how many times in military, police, and security briefings I heard the phrase, "To create a free market economy,” as one of the goals. The irony was that many CPA officials would have been for small, decentralized, states rights style government back home, but were trying to build a large, strong centralized government in Iraq. Also, many of the, I don't know what else to call them, young kids in their 20s, came with recommendations from the Heritage Foundation, and other conservative organizations. Many were just out of college or were taking a gap year to have an adventure in Baghdad. Most of them would have been doing unpaid internships if it weren't for Iraq.

35. The CPA came up with a plan to disband Iraq’s militias and integrate them into the security forces. Did you know about those? Do you have any ideas for why that plan failed?

I think you're referring to CPA Order 91 that was issued in June 2004, just before the transition of control to the Iraqi Interim Government. Order 91 was issued on June 7, 2004, and the Transition took place on June 28, 2004. The Order appeared to be an afterthought, and a form of plausible deniability. At best, it served as guidance for the new Iraqi government, at worst, as proved the case, the new Iraqi government essentially ignored it except when it was to their internal domestic political advantage against Muqtada al-Sadr or Sunni groups.

SOURCES

Allbritton, Christopher, “Why Iraq’s Police Are a Menace,” Time, 5/20/06

Cordesman, Anthony, “The Current Military Situation in Iraq,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 11/14/03

Daragahi, Borzou, “Massacre feared a setup,” San Francisco Chronicle, 10/26/04

Diamond, Larry, “What Went Wrong in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2004

Edmonson, George, “Iraq routinely torturing prisoners, group says,” San Francisco Chronicle, 1/26/05

Elliott, Michael, “Occupation Hazards,” Time, 6/9/03

Gordon, Michael, “For Training Iraq’s Police, the Main Problem Was Time,” New York Times, 10/21/04

Hider, James, “West Turns Blind Eye As Police Put Saddam’s Torturers Back To Work,” Times of London, 7/7/05

Inskeep, Steve, “Competent Police Force is Key to Iraq Peace,” NPR, 5/9/06

Knowlton, Brian, “U.S. alleges rights abuses by Iraqis,” San Francisco Chronicle, 3/1/05

Lardner, Richard, “Roots of Iraq weapon probes date to 2004,” Associated Press, 9/27/07

Maas, Peter, “The Way of the Commandos,” New York Times Magazine, 5/1/05

Oppel, Richard and Glanz, James, “Iraqi forces wilting under relentless attacks,” San Francisco Chronicle, 11/30/04

PBS Frontline, “Interview Gen. Jay Garner,” Truth, War and Consequences, 10/9/03

- “Interview Robert Perito,” Truth, War and Consequences, 10/9/03

Pfaff, Tony, “Development And Reform Of The Iraqi Police Forces,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army, January 2008

Pincus, Walter, “Report criticizes spending by contractor hired to train Iraqi police,” Washington Post, 1/25/10

Police Futurist, “Interview: Our Guy in Iraq,” Winter 2006-2007

Sennott, Charles, “The Good Soldier,” Men’s Journal, June 2008

Silverstein, Ken, “Jerry Burke on Iraq’s Corrupt Police Force,” Harper’s Magazine, 9/11/07

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Iraqi Security Forces: Police Training Program Developed Sizeable Force, but Capabilities Are Unknown,” 10/25/11

- “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Government,” 7/30/07

Tyson, Ann Scott, “U.S. Commanders Say Iraqi Police Can Be Reformed,” Washington Post, 12/11/07

United States Government Accountability Office, “DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces,” July 2007

Updike, Nancy, “I’m From the Private Sector and I’m Here to Help,” This American Life, 6/4/04

Washington Post, “U.S. changes tactics in Iraq,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/24/04

2011 Sees Second Most Refugee Returns Since 2003 Invasion Of Iraq

2012-02-08T07:28:00.000-08:00

2011 saw the second most refugee returns to Iraq since the 2003 invasion. There were already hundreds of thousands of refugees inside and out of the country due to the previous regime’s Anfal campaign against the Kurds, and the suppression of the Shiite uprising following the 1991 Gulf War. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and the subsequent insurgency and civil war, set off a new wave of displacement in the country, adding one to two more million refugees. Since the sectarian war ended in 2008 however, more and more Iraqis have been making the trip back.

The number of Iraqis returning has gone up and down over the last eight years. In 2003, an estimated 55,429 refugees came back to Iraq according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The following year saw the most returns so far at 291,997. Around 98,000 were internally displaced, and 193,997 were refugees. After that, the numbers began to go down until hitting a low in 2007. In 2005, 154,155 came back. That went up a little to 170,235 in 2006, before going way down to 81,420 in 2007. The next two years saw a large increase at 221,260 in 2008, and 204,830 in 2009. In 2010, there was a drop to 118,890. Then last year, there was another large jump to 260,690. 193,610 of those were internally displaced. In total, from 2003-2008 1,558,906 Iraqis returned. 1,031,720, 66% were displaced, while 527,186 were refugees. The UNHCR speculated that the improvement in security, and an increase in government aid offered to returnees were the two main reasons why Iraqis came back. If that were true however, there should have been a steady number of people coming back from 2008 to 2011. Instead, there was a large drop in 2010 compared to the other three years. The United Nations believed that was due to uncertainty over the country's future during parliamentary elections that were held that year. The unrest in the Middle East was likely a motivating factor as 2011 saw the second highest number of refugees coming back since 2004. The numbers bore that out with the UNHCR recording 28,230 Iraqis making the trip from Syria in 2011, compared to 29,135 from 2009-2010. 985 Iraqis also came back from Libya, compared to around 400 from 2009-2010. With Syria on the verge of civil war, returns should continue at a high rate going into 2012 as well.

Iraqi Displaced And Refugee Returns 2003-2011

	Displaced	Refugees	Total
2003	0	55,429	55,429
2004	98,000	193,997	291,997
2005	98,000	56,155	154,155
2006	150,000	20,235	170,235
2007	36,000	45,420	81,420
2008	195,890	25,370	221,260
2009	167,740	37,090	204,830
2010	92,480	26,410	118,890
2011	193,610	67,080	260,690
	1,031,720	527,186	1,558,906

Monthly Returns 2011

	Displaced	Refugees	Total
Jan.	3,360	3,040	6,400
Feb.	2,910	3,260	6,170
Mar.	4,300	4,570	8,870
Apr.	9,820	3,680	13,500
May	16,820	4,620	21,440
Jun.	16,400	4,240	20,640
Jul.	14,360	4,850	19,210
Aug.	33,130	10,750	43,880
Sep.	23,660	7,220	30,880
Oct.	25,770	8,630	34,400
Nov.	20,140	5,260	25,400
Dec.	22,940	6,960	29,900
2011	193,610	67,080	260,690

During 2011, the rate of return steadily climbed from the beginning of the year until the middle, when it hit a plateau. From January to March, from 6,170 to 8,870 Iraqis came back. Then the numbers began to increase from 13,500 in April, to 21,400 in May, then leveling off before hitting a yearly high at 43,880 in August. After that 20,000-30,000 returned each month for the rest of 2011. Baghdad was the main destination for these people with around 150,400 returnees. That was followed by 53,790 coming back to Diyala, 7,880 to Najaf, 7,470 to Basra, and 7,290 to Karbala to finish off the top five provinces. The increase in 2011 was due to both internally displaced and refugees returning in the second half of the year.

2011 Returns By Province

Province	Returns
Baghdad	150,400
Diyala	53,790
Najaf	7,880
Basra	7,470
Karbala	7,290
Babil	5,910
Anbar	4,890
Maysan	4,550
Wasit	3,970
Ninewa	3,400
Dhi Qar	3,130
Salahaddin	2,820
Tamim	1,820
Qadisiyah	1,410
Muthanna	1,110
Irbil	650
Dohuk	120
Sulaymaniya	80

Despite 1.5 million people returning, there were still almost the same number registered as refugees. In August 2011, there were 1,258,934 internally displaced registered with the Iraqi government. There were another 168,765 refugees counted by the United Nations in Syria, 101,904, Jordan, 33,677, Turkey, 10,712, Lebanon, 9,246, Egypt, 7,527, Iran, 3,512, and the Gulf States, 2,186. That’s no where near the total for Iraqi refugees, as many have been living abroad for five to seven years now. Many have gotten jobs, and started over, and no longer need to go to the United Nations for aid and assistance. The figure for the displaced, is probably much closer to the actual figure. That showed that there are still a large number of people suffering from the Iraq conflict both within and without the country.

Internal Refugees Registered With Iraqi Ministry of Displacement August 2011

Province	Displaced
Baghdad	303,394
Ninewa	178,314
Diyala	114,423
Dohuk	84,402
Anbar	51,514
Wasit	50,907
Karbala	50,310
Babil	50,300
Dhi Qar	48,253
Tamim	46,694
Salahaddin	45,672
Maysan	38,130
Basra	35,058
Qadisiyah	22,652
In other 4 provinces	11,807
TOTAL	1,258,934

Iraqi Refugees Registered With U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees By Country

Country	Refugees
Syria	101,904
Jordan	33,677
Turkey	10,712
Lebanon	9,246
Egypt	7,527
Iran	3,512
Gulf States	2,186
TOTAL	168,764

The displacement of Iraqis is largely over. There are occasional attacks, that drive people from their homes, but it is nothing like what was seen during the civil war period from 2005-2008. Now, more and more Iraqis are coming back. That has not been at a steady rate as the last three years have shown. The unrest in the Middle East appeared to be an impetus for more refugees coming back last year than the year before. Improved security is also providing a push for internally displaced. Despite 1.5 million coming back, there are still an estimated 2 million who are not living in their original homes. Many of those have decided to settle where they live, either abroad or within Iraq. The displaced are still facing difficulties with that transition, leading to so many to register with the Ministry of Displacement seeking aid. The plight of refugees appears a little better off as only around 168,000 are still going to the United Nations for assistance. Many more have apparently moved on with their lives in other countries. Iraq was suffering from a large refugee problem before 2003 due to the policies of Saddam Hussein. His fall from power only added more people to that mix. For the last couple years at least, it appears that large numbers of Iraqis are deciding to reverse that trend and comeback to their country.

SOURCES

Rao, Prashant, “Lack of Iraq govt hurting security and refugee returns,” Agence France Pressure, 9/29/10

UNHCR Iraq Operation, “Monthly Statistical Update on Return – December 2011,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, February 2012

UNHCR VIDEO: One Day On Earth - Iraq November 2011

2012-02-08T07:27:00.000-08:00

UNHCR Iraq from One Day on Earth 2011 Partners on Vimeo.

Iraq Still A Deadlier Place Than Afghanistan

2012-02-07T07:31:00.000-08:00

In the West, Afghanistan has garnered far more press than Iraq in recent years. The deployment of additional troops under President Obama, and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq were the two main causes. The media made it appear that Afghanistan was a far deadlier conflict than Iraq, which no longer has a full blown insurgency, and suffers more from a very serious terrorist threat. Statistics just released by the United Nations however, show that far more people died in Iraq in 2011 than in Afghanistan.

The United Nations just released an end of the year report on violence in Afghanistan for 2011. The paper, put together by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the United Nations Assistance Mission In Afghanistan counted 3,021 civilian deaths last year. That was the fifth year in a row that casualties had gone up in the country. In 2010, 2,790 were killed, and in 2009, 2,412. Last year, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were the deadliest weapon used in the conflict, accounting for 32% of all deaths. After that, 495 were killed in targeted assassinations, and another 450 died from suicide bombers. That showed that militants in the country were using more standoff weapons, and going after specific members of the security forces and government rather than participating in large-scale operations involving many fighters.

	Afghanistan (U.N.)	Iraq (Iraq Body Count)
2011	3,021	4,087
2010	2,790	4,045
2009	2,412	4,713

Iraq had far higher numbers for the last three years. Iraq Body Count, which is widely regarded as the most accurate compiler of casualties in the country had 4,087 deaths in 2011, followed by 4,045 in 2010, and 4,713 in 2009. Even averages of Iraq Body Count, the United Nations, and the Iraqi government resulted in higher figures than were seen in Afghanistan. In 2011 for instance, there was an average of 3,244 deaths, and in 2010, an average of 4,204. Based upon the Iraq Body Count figures, more than 1,000 people were killed in Iraq last year than Afghanistan. In total, Iraq had 35% more casualties in 2011. In 2009, the numbers were even starker with just under twice as many people killed in Iraq as in Afghanistan. The two countries are also a good comparison, because they have roughly the same populations. According to the Central Intelligence Agency, Afghanistan had an estimated 29,835,392 people in 2011, compared to 30,399,572 in Iraq.

The numbers show that while the Afghan insurgency has grown deadlier, it is not as effective as the militants in Iraq who are in decline. Iraq no longer has a civil war or even a brewing insurgency. Like in Afghanistan, most attacks in Iraq today are IEDs or car bombs. Militants and security forces hardly ever face each other, and insurgents can no longer operate openly as they once did with parades and videos made in the streets of large cities. Afghanistan on the other hand, has large swaths where militants can operate, plus safe havens in Pakistan, and the support of the military there. What Iraq has is a more urban culture, which provides far more targets than rural Afghanistan. It is much easier in Iraq for instance, to plant a bomb in a high-density area, and get large casualty figures than it is in Afghanistan. For that reason, Iraq is likely to continue to be a deadlier place than Afghanistan into the foreseeable future, despite the decline of the insurgency there.

SOURCES

CIA World Factbook

Iraq Body Count

United Nations Assistance Mission In Afghanistan, “UNAMA PRESS RELEASE: Civilian casualties rise for fifth consecutive year in Afghan conflict,” 2/4/12

CNN VIDEO: Iran's Influence In Iraq

2012-02-07T07:30:00.000-08:00

January 2012 Security Statistics Undermine Case That Iraq Heading Towards New Civil War

2012-02-06T07:43:00.000-08:00

January 2012 has just come to an end, and the early numbers for deaths and attacks in Iraq have been released. Despite all the press about a new sectarian war, the statistics show that there was an increase in casualties last month, but they were close to figures seen in 2011. Insurgents were obviously trying to send a message after the departure of U.S. forces in December, but the Shiite pilgrimage of Arbayeen also provided a plethora of targets. In previous years, militants have only been able to keep up this level of activity for a month or two, and then they have had to re-group and re-arm. That points to January being a continuation of past trends in security, rather than a sign that Iraq will have a renewed civil conflict.

Two of the three organizations that maintain monthly death counts for Iraq showed increases in January 2012. Iraq Body Count’s early total was 458 killed, up from 371 in December 2011. The United Nations had 500 deaths, compared to 313 the previous month. Iraq’s ministries however, only counted 151 deaths, down from 155 in December. Baghdad has consistently had the lowest casualty figures over the last several months. With Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki running both the Interior and Defense Ministries since the new government was put together in December 2011, there’s growing evidence that the numbers are being kept down for political reasons. How else could one explain death figures going down when there were more mass casualty bombings in January than December?

January saw an increase in casualties, because of three deadly days. First, on January 5, a suicide bomber detonated his device amongst Shiite pilgrims in the town of Batha in Dhi Qar province, killing a total of 45 people. They were heading for Karbala during Arbayeen, which commemorates the death of the Imam Hussein Ibn Ali. That same day, a car bomb killed 15 in the Kadhimiya district of northwest Baghdad, and another 13 day workers died as a result of a motorcycle bomb in Sadr City, northeastern Baghdad. Then on January 14, 64 were killed by a suicide bomber in Zubayr, Basra province as they were going to the Khatwa mosque. Khatwa is a popular destination for people in southern Iraq who cannot make the trip to Karbala. Finally, on January 27, there were 28 casualties when a car bomb exploded near a hospital in Zafaraniya, southeastern Baghdad. It’s mass casualty bombings like these that raise the total death count for any given month above the average. Since January was the occasion of Arbayeen there were thousands upon thousands of Shiite pilgrims taking the bus and even walking across the entire width of the country to get to Karbala or other alternative sites like the Khatwa mosque. That provided a huge number of targets, which insurgents have taken advantage of every year, and that was the reason why deaths increased from December to January.

Deadliest Days In January 2012
Jan. 5 – 77 killed total
    - 28 killed in Baghdad
    - 45 killed in Dhi Qar
Jan. 14 – 68 killed total
    - 65 killed in Basra
Jan. 27 – 41 killed total
    - 35 killed in Baghdad

Overall, January’s totals were high, but similar to numbers seen during 2011. The average for all three organizations that track Iraqi deaths was 369 for the month, 11.9 deaths per day, plus there were 330 attacks according to the United Nations, which averaged out to 10.6 per day. The monthly casualties’ average was close to the 364 killed in August 2011, and the 360 in June, which were the two highest counts for last year. The daily average deaths was actually below the highest figure for 2011, which was 12.0 in June, but similar. It was also close to the 11.7 killed in August, and the 11.0 in October. There were far more attacks in previous months. The high for 2011 was 565 in March, followed by 561 in May, and 483 in April. The insurgents were not only more efficient in January 2012, but had more targets with Arbayeen, which accounted for the higher casualties despite fewer attacks then previous months.

Deaths In Iraq 2011-2012

Month	Iraq Body Count	Iraqi Ministries	United Nations	Avg. Monthly Deaths	Avg. Daily Deaths
Jan. 2011	387	259	265	303	9.7
Feb.	250	167	267	228	8.1
Mar.	307	247	268	274	8.8
Apr.	285	211	279	258	8.6
May	378	177	319	291	9.3
Jun.	385	271	424	360	12.0
Jul.	305	259	381	315	10.1
Aug.	398	239	455	364	11.7
Sep.	394	185	405	328	10.9
Oct.	355	258	416	343	11.0
Nov.	272	187	264	241	8.0
Dec.	371	155	313	279	9.0
TOTALS	4,125	1,591	4,056	-	-
2011 Mo. Avg.	343	217	338	298	9.7
Jan. 2012	458	151	500	369	11.9

Attacks In Iraq 2011-2012

Month	Attacks	Avg. Daily Attacks
Jan. 2011	416	13.4
Feb.	358	12.7
Mar.	565	18.2
Apr.	483	16.1
May	561	18.0
Jun.	545	18.1
Jul.	404	13.0
Aug.	376	12.1
Sep.	283	9.1
Oct.	406	13.0
Nov.	268	8.0
Dec.	293	9.4
TOTALS	4,958	-
2011 Mo. Avg.	413.1	13.4
Jan. 2012	330	10.6

Attacks By Province January 2012
Baghdad 73
Ninewa 72
Diyala 58
Tamim 36
Salahaddin 32
Anbar 21
Babil 21
Basra 6
Dhi Qar 3
Sulaymaniya 2
Karbala 2
Wasit 2
Qadisiyah 1
Maysan 1

Types of Attacks January 2012
202 improvised explosive devices
92 small arms fire
22 car bombs
9 mortar/rockets
5 grenades

What the statistics show was that while January had a large number of deaths, they were not that much different from the highs seen in 2011. That belied the press coverage that grew in intensity as the month went on claiming that Iraq was on the verge of a new sectarian civil war. As usual, whenever there is a rise in deadly attacks in Iraq, the media starts ringing the alarm bells with very little analysis. The fact that the United States withdrew its forces in 2011, and the on-going political dispute between Iraq’s parties only added to the sense of doom and gloom in most of the reporting. The fact that there were equally high months of deaths when the United States had thousands of soldiers on the ground, and that the leading Iraqi parties have been arguing since 2010 over the elections were also overlooked.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “64 killings, 137 wounded in Basrah explosion,” 1/14/12
- “SECURITY: Victims of al-Batha’a township, Thi-Qar Province, rise to 30 killed, 70 injured,” 1/5/12

Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Security in Iraq”

Iraq Body Count

Reuters, “Iraq civilian deaths rise in January-govt figures,” 2/1/12

Yusef, Mortedha, “28 killed in Baghdad bombing,” AK News, 1/27/12

VIDEO: Iraq vs UAE 0-1 1/5/12

2012-02-06T07:42:00.000-08:00

Malls In Iraq's Baghdad

2012-02-03T07:40:00.000-08:00

Iraq may have a state-dominated, oil dependent economy, but that doesn't mean Iraqis and foreign investors aren't trying their hand at new private businesses. Below are some images of a new shopping mall that just opened in Baghdad, and another under construction.

The new Maximall in Baghdad, January 2012 (Reuters)

Inside the new mall (Reuters)

Another shot of the interior of the new mall (Reuters)

Another shopping center under construction in Baghdad (Reuters)

VIDEO: Historic Photographs Of The Old Beloved Baghdad

2012-02-03T07:38:00.000-08:00

VIDEO: A Good Day Old Photos of Baghdad

2012-02-03T07:36:00.000-08:00

VIDEO: Old Baghdad

2012-02-03T07:34:00.000-08:00

VIDEO: A Romance Of Old Baghdad

2012-02-03T07:32:00.000-08:00

VIDEO: The Old Baghdad

2012-02-03T07:30:00.000-08:00

VIDEO: Old Baghdad To Old People

2012-02-03T07:29:00.000-08:00

What’s Next For Exxon’s Oil Deal With Iraq’s Kurds?

2012-02-02T07:33:00.000-08:00

On October 18, 2011, Exxon Mobile and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) signed a deal to work on six oil and gas tracts in northern Iraq. When it was made public the following month, it led to an outcry by the central government. At first, it seemed like Baghdad held the upper hand, and it might be able to get the oil major to back off. The latest news however, seems to point to Exxon moving ahead with the contract, despite the protestations of the Iraqi government.

Exxon has said nothing official about its plans for Kurdistan, but it appears to be moving forward. On January 26, 2012, Reuters reported that the company had people in northern Iraq scouting locations for living and work facilities. Exxon officials allegedly met with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Natural Resource Minister Ashti Hawrami as well. Outgoing Kurdish Premier Barham Saleh has said that the Exxon deal was constitutional, and they stand behind it. The Kurds are obviously anxious to see this come to fruition as it would be the first time a major international energy company agreed to work with them. It could attract others, and give the region more leverage vis-à-vis Baghdad on oil and gas policy. Exxon on the other hand, seems to be quietly preparing the ground work for it to enter Kurdistan, and move ahead with developing the fields it signed up for.

The central government was originally incensed over this issue. Starting in late-November, officials in Baghdad released a barrage of verbal attacks upon Exxon and the Kurds. The Oil Ministry threatened to exclude Exxon from the planned 4th bidding round for new oil and gas fields in 2012 if the company didn’t cancel its deal with the Kurds. The Ministry went on to say that the contract was illegal. Oil Minister Abdul Karim Luaibi claimed that the Kurds could not hold their own negotiations with foreign oil companies. It demanded that Exxon decide between working in southern Iraq on the West Qurna Phase 1 field in Basra or Kurdistan. In 2009, Exxon won an auction to develop West Qurna, which has 8.7 million barrels in reserves. Next, Deputy Premier Hussein Shahristani who is charge of energy policy announced in December that Baghdad was considering sanctions against Exxon. Prime Minister Maliki issued the most fiery statement, claiming that if the corporation moved ahead it could cause war, because three of the six blocs it signed for are in disputed territories in Tamim and Ninewa provinces. Maliki has also threatened to cancel Exxon’s West Qurna deal in retaliation. Finally, Governor Atheel Nujafi of Ninewa spoke out against the Exxon deal, and the provincial council there voted for Baghdad to send troops to stop the company from working there. The Maliki government’s entire oil policy has been based upon asserting the authority of the central government over all aspects of the industry. The Exxon-Kurd contract therefore represents a threat to everything the administration has been working for, because it did not involve the Oil Ministry. That’s why there were so many attacks upon the deal from officials in Baghdad.

There are other elements at play as well in this drama. One, is that Exxon is owed $50 million for two years worth of work at West Qurna Phase 1. Allegedly red tape is holding up the payments, and the problem is being worked on. Until that happens however, Exxon is working for free in southern Iraq, and incurring huge costs at the same time. Two, other major oil companies seem interested in entering Kurdistan. France’s Total for instance, is said to be exploring possible deals in northern Iraq. The first issue is a major one. Exxon has expressed many complaints about the contract it signed with the Oil Ministry in 2009, and the fact that it is not garnering any profits obviously undermines any leverage Baghdad may have in its talks with the company over Kurdistan. That gives Exxon an incentive to move north, because it might actually get paid, and the threats by the central government to take action against West Qurna do not hold as much weight. The second one complicates the dispute even more. If other big oil companies are willing to do business with the Kurds, it adds fuel to the fire between the two sides.

As things currently stand, it seems like Exxon might have gotten the better of this situation. While work in Kurdistan cannot be expected to start anytime soon, it appears that the corporation will eventually work there. It doesn’t look like Baghdad will sanction it either, as it included Exxon in the up coming fourth bidding round despite threats to not do so. What happens next is the big question. Will Exxon work in the three fields that are in disputed territories? Could this lead to a compromise between Baghdad and Kurdistan? What affect will this have upon Maliki’s State of Law list is also important. Deputy Premier Shahristani has been in charge of the country’s oil policy for years now since he was the Oil Minister in the first Maliki administration. He is also a major part of the State of Law coalition, and has his own independent power base within the party. He has been the most vocal opponent of the Kurds’ energy strategy. This might force his hand to either re-evaluate his position, or up his attacks. That could have wide ranging affects upon Iraq, because it could complicate the Oil Ministry’s attempts to sign new contracts. Companies are already complaining about their existing deals like Exxon has, and the 4^th bidding round has been delayed once again, because corporations are asking for better terms. Continued threats against Exxon would only make these negotiations more difficult. Iraq thus finds itself at a crossroads in its oil policy. Exxon is slowly, but surely starting its work in Kurdistan, forcing Baghdad to respond. How it deals with the situation will likely require it to change its entire approach to foreign companies.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Exxon to reconsider Kurdistan deal: Iraqi PM,” 12/15/11

- “Iraq’s Kurdistan insists Exxon oil deal is constitutional,” Al Arabiya, 11/25/11

- “Kurds must decide to stay or leave: Iraq minister,” 12/9/11

Ajrash, Kadhim and Razzouk, Nayla, “Iraq Oil Output Has Reached a 20-Year High, Shahristani Says,” Bloomberg, 12/22/11

AK News, “Iraq to exclude Exxon Mobil from 4^th oil licensing round,” 11/26/11

Ali, Hussam, “Committee calls for transparent oil,” AK News, 11/15/11

Bergin, Tom and Farge, Emma, “WRAPUP 1-Kurd, Baghdad oil officials met on Exxon spat,” Reuters, 11/17/11

Brosk, Raman, “Rising criticism of Shahristani’s position in Exxon Mobile dispute,” AK News, 11/15/11

Dagher, Sam, “Iraq Won’t Cancel ExxonMobil Deal,” Wall Street Journal, 12/9/11

Dagher, Sam and Ammar, Munaf, “Iraq Leader Warns of Coalition’s End,” Wall Street Journal, 12/21/11

Falush, Simon and Cohn, Carolyn, “Iraq attacks Exxon for signing deal with Kurdish region,” Reuters, 11/22/11

Hafidh, Hassan, “Total Submits Plan To Utilize Gas From Iraq Missan Oil Fields –Official,” Dow Jones, 1/27/12

Hafidh, Hassan and Herron, James, “ExxonMobil May Lose Other Iraq Oil Contact On Kurdish Deal – Govt,” Dow Jones, 11/11/11

International Business Times, “Total Close to Securing Oil-and-Gas Exploration Rights in Iraqi Kurdistan: Report,” 1/29/12

Kramer, Andrew, “Iraq Criticizes Exxon Mobil for Its Deal With the Kurds,” New York Times, 11/13/11

Kramer, Andrew and Werdigier, Julia, “Exxon Spars With Iraq Over Lack of Payment,” New York Times, 12/22/11

Lando, Ben, “All About Kurdish Oil : Q&A: Ashti Hawrami, the Kurdish minister of natural resources,” Iraq Oil Report, 11/15/11

Pfeifer, Sylvia, “Exxon signs Kurd exploration contracts,” Financial Times, 11/10/11

Pfeifer, Sylvia and Blas, Javier, “Shell pulls out of Kurdistan oil talks,” Financial Times, 11/16/11

Razzouk, Nayla and Ajrash, Kadhim, “Iraq Hasn’t Agreed to Recognize Kurdish Drilling Contracts,” Bloomberg, 11/12/11

Reuters, “Exxon Scouts already in Erbil,” Iraq Business News, 1/26/12

Al-Salhy, Suadad, “Iraq says to act against Exxon over Kurd deal,” Reuters, 11/16/11

Serle, Jack, “Exxon Mobil Corp. at center of oil row,” AK News, 11/14/11

Sowell, Kirk, “Inside Iraqi Politics No. 28,” 12/5/11

Al-Wannan, Jaafar, “Energy spat violates Erbil-Baghdad agreement,” AK News, 11/13/11

AL JAZEERA VIDEO: Kurdish Refugees From Syria Languish In Iraq

2012-02-02T07:32:00.001-08:00

CNN VIDEO: U.S. Drones Over Baghdad

2012-02-02T07:32:00.000-08:00

2011 Bad Year For Journalists In Iraq

2012-02-01T07:27:00.000-08:00

Reporters Without Borders released its World Press Freedom Index for 2011-2012. In it, Iraq dropped 22 places to 152 out of 179 countries in freedom of the media. This report was the latest bad news for Iraq’s journalists who faced a barrage of attacks by the security forces in the first half of the year as they attempted to cover the protests that broke out across the country. Reporters were killed, arrested, and their offices were raided, and burned down during the year. That shows that Iraq still has a ways to go to become a full democracy where reporters can act freely without fear of reprisal by the authorities.

Iraq took a large drop in the standings in the World Press Freedom Index. It went from 130 in 2010-2011 to number 152 in 2011-2012. That put it close to what it was in 2008 when it had a ranking of 168. The major reason for the decline was attacks upon journalists during the protests that occurred in Iraq during the first half of the year. Journalists were routinely targeted by the security forces when covering demonstrations in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square and in Sulaymaniya along with other parts of the country. A famous case was radio host Hadi al-Mahdi. He was originally arrested on February 25, 2011, Iraq’s Day of Rage. He was having lunch with three other journalists at a café after attending the day’s demonstration. 15 soldiers picked him and his friends up, took him to the headquarters of the 11^th Army Division, interrogated him, beat him, electrocuted him, and threatened him with rape. He and his colleagues were all eventually released. Mahdi continued on as a critic of the government and attending rallies in Baghdad. He started getting death threats to stop, and was eventually killed in his home on September 8. The authorities were widely believed to be behind his death. It was attacks and deaths like these that Reports Without Borders marked Iraq down for.

Journalist Haid al-Mahdi at his Radio Demozy before his death in Sep. 2011 (New York Times)

International human rights organizations and Iraqi media groups noted a similar pattern of violence against journalists in Iraq in 2011. In April 2011 Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch both released reports about Iraq’s protest movement. Amnesty noted that the Iraqi security forces raided the Baghdad offices of Al-Diyar TV station, stopping it from covering the demonstrations, and arresting seven staff members. In Karbala, a Reuters' reporter was beaten and hospitalized by the police. A Radio Sawa journalist in Mosul was also attacked, and stopped from covering the day’s events there as well. Human Rights Watch had similar examples, such as interviewing 20 Iraqi reporters who all said they had been intimidated, harassed, received death threats, been arrested and beaten, or had their equipment taken. It also noted that the Kurdish press group Metro Center documented 150 cases of attacks and harassment upon Kurdish journalists by the security forces from February to May as they were covering the protest movement in Sulaymaniya. That would be the focus of a May report by the group that noted that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was committing massive media abuses. The regional government had filed lawsuits, and used beatings, arrests, and death threats in an attempt to limit the coverage of the demonstrations. Finally, in its World Report 2012, Human Rights Watch said that the situation within Iraq was poor due in part to a government crackdown on the media. Within the country, the Metro Center for Defense of Journalists in Kurdistan said there were 359 violations against the media in the region by the end of 2011. That included 85 beatings, 81 preventions of doing work, 57 threats, 52 arrests, 41 confiscations of equipment, 9 cases of destroyed equipment, 9 attacks on media offices, 9 shootings, 8 cases of offices being set on fire, 4 fire bombings, 2 shootings at TV channels, one case of planting a bomb at an office, and one burning of a journalist’s vehicle. Similarly, the Kurdistan Union of Journalists reported 277 cases of abuses against the media in the region for the year, 257 of which were during the demonstrations in Sulaymaniya that started in February. This showed a concerted effort by Baghdad and Irbil to stop the media from covering the protests that broke out at the beginning of the year. They did not want coverage of those events, nor for the news to spread to other parts of the country. Their choice of tactics was the use of force to intimidate the media into backing off.

A reporter being punched by a policeman while covering demonstrations in Basra 2011 (AP)

In terms of its neighbors, Iraq was right in the middle according to Reporters Without Borders, which is ironic, because it is one of the only democracies in the entire region. Out of the 19 countries in the Middle East and North Africa, Iraq was number 18. Kuwait at 78, Israel and Lebanon at 93, were at the top, while Bahrain, 173, Iran, 175, and Syria, 176, were at the bottom. Israel and Lebanon are democracies so it should be no surprise that they ranked so high. Kuwait is still a monarchy, but obviously gives its media a lot of freedom. Palestine and Iraq are the only other countries with elected governments and they both fell in the middle of the pack at 133 and 152 respectively. Iraq obviously has a lot more work to do develop this part of its political culture, because it is the lowest ranked democracy in the region, and even behind eight countries that aren’t.

Middle East/North Africa Rankings By Reporters Without Borders

1. Kuwait 78

2. Israel 93

2. Lebanon 93

4. UAE 112

5. Qatar 114

6. Oman tied 117

7. Algeria tied 122

8. Jordan 128

9. Palestine 133

10. Tunisia 134

11. Morocco 138

12. Iraq 152

13. Libya tied 154

14. Saudi Arabia 158

15. Egypt 166

16. Yemen 171

17. Bahrain 173

18. Iran 175

19. Syria 176

Iraq is one of only four democracies in the Middle East and North Africa, but the government did not seem to appreciate what that entailed in 2011. When faced with dissent, both the central and regional Kurdish governments resorted to using the security forces to carry out arbitrary arrests, secret attacks, beatings, and other abusive tactics against members of the media. This happened across the country, not just in Baghdad and Sulaymaniya. Allowing a free press is an essential part of developing a democratic society. Letting the public know what is going on in the country, so that it may make choices about its future politicians is an important ingredient in any elected form of government. It is no surprise that Iraq has been labeled a struggling democracy, because it does not have all of the liberties that one entails yet as shown in the events of 2011.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraq’s protest movement: despondent and divided,” 1/31/12

Amnesty International, “Days Of Rage, Protests and Repression In Iraq,” April 2011

Arango, Tim, “Text Messages Proliferate as Threats in Iraq,” New York Times, 4/26/11

Aswat al-Iraq, “20 atrocities cases against journalists in Kurdistan registered – report,” 12/27/11

- “359 violation cases against journalists reported in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region in 2011,” 1/14/12

- “Feb. 25^th – Bad Day for freedom of press and democracy in Iraq:,” 2/26/11

BNO News, “Over 160 attacks against Iraqi journalists, media institutions in two weeks,” 3/10/11

Human Rights Watch, “Iraq Widening Crackdown on Protests,” 4/21/11

- “Iraqi Kurdistan: Growing Effort to Silence Media,” 5/24/11

- “World Report 2012,” 1/22/12

Al-Jourani, Flaiyeh, “Violence against journalists soars in some Iraqi provinces,” AK News, 4/6/11

Al-Mandalawi, Bashar, “Attacks on journalists up 55%,” AK News, 5/3/11

National Iraqi News Agency, “Demonstrators in Baghdad urges government to force Kuwait not to build Mubarak sea-port,” 7/29/11

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Journalists Press Charges Over Assault At Protest,” 3/9/11

Reporters Without Borders, “World Press Freedom Index 2011-2012,” 1/25/12

Shelton, Tracey, “”The Other Iraq” not so free after all,” Global Post, 5/29/11

Van Heuvelen, Ben, “The Man Who Would Be King,” Foreign Policy, 6/13/11

Van Wilgenburg, Wladimir, “HRW: Kurdish Government Not Better Than Saddam Hussein’s,” Rudaw, 5/28/11

Al-Yousef, Murtadha, “Journalist detained at Baghdad protest,” AK News, 7/24/11

Kurdistan Democratic Party About To Assume Kurdish Premiership

2012-01-31T07:28:00.002-08:00

The long awaited transfer of power over the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) premiership is about to happen. In January 2011, it was announced that the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) would be taking the prime minister’s position from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Nechirvan Barzani of the KDP who held the position previously will replace current Premier Barham Saleh. Saleh had a tough two years in office, with his PUK party facing defections, the emergence of the Change List opposition group, and demonstrations in its base province Sulaymaniya.

Nechirvan Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party is about to return as the Kurdish prime minister (KRG)

The transfer of power between the two ruling Kurdish parties has been talked about for months. In November 2011, a leading member in the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) said that the two parties would swap the premiership. Then on January 16, 2012, the KDP officially announced that Nechirvan Barzani would return to be prime minister. Members in the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) wanted to hold onto the position for four years, just as Barzani did previously, but that did not happen.

Barham Saleh (KRG)

Barham Saleh originally took office in 2009 at a disadvantage, because of the change in fortunes for his PUK. Before, Saleh was the deputy premier to Nouri al-Maliki, and the number three man in the PUK hierarchy. By 2009, the PUK was losing its standing vis-a-vis the KDP. It was facing internal divisions, and defections. Then in July 2009, Kurdistan held regional parliamentary elections and the new Change List, which was formed by ex-PUK members won in Sulaymaniya, the PUK’s base. The voting solidified the KDP as the stronger of the two ruling parties. Afterward, KDP members discussed ending its 50-50 split of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) administration with the PUK, and perhaps even denying Saleh the premiership. The transfer between Nechirvan Barzani and Saleh went ahead anyway in August. The PUK and KDP had been roughly equal beforehand, and had a series of power sharing agreements, which divided power between the two in Kurdistan. As part of that, the two parties would switch the premiership every two years. The loss in standing by the PUK would change that relationship, and that put Saleh in a tough position even before he became the new KRG premier.

Thousands protested in Sulaymaniya in 2011 until the government put an end to them (Matt Willingham)

In his two years in office, Saleh faced even more challenges. There were reports that he wanted to replace Kurdish Natural Resource Minister Ashti Hawrami for example, because he disagreed with his oil policies, but he was overruled by the KDP. More importantly, in February 2011, protests broke out in Sulaymaniya. As a result, Saleh was called before the Kurdish parliament for questioning about the demonstrations, and survived a no confidence vote. (1) Saleh said that he agreed with all of the protesters’ main demands, and privately wrote a letter to Iraq’s President and PUK head Jalal Talabani saying that their party was not able to deal with the public’s outrage. Saleh allegedly offered to resign, and said that the KRG needed deep political reform and a change in ministers. The KRG ended up using force to break up the protests in April. During Saleh’s two years in office, the regional government continued to go after journalists and media outlets that criticized it as well. Saleh had a difficult two years. While he sometimes spoke of change within the Kurdistan region, the government showed no real signs that it was willing to do so. In fact, its authoritarian side was revealed when it cracked down on demonstrators, and went after the media. The KDP and PUK were not willing to let go of power or even allow citizens to openly criticize it for that long whether in the streets or in the press.

Nechirvan Barzani will now become the new KRG prime minister. There will be changes in the cabinet, but no real difference in policies. Politics are still dominated by the KDP and PUK who rely upon a huge bureaucracy, patronage system, and tribal and family ties. Even with the emergence of the Change List and other opposition parties, this hold on power has not really been shaken. When Barzani last took office in 2006 he was also facing public discontent over corruption and other issues, but did nothing substantive about it. What Barzani’s assumption of power will mean is that the KDP will solidify itself as the main Kurdish party as it will hold both the premiership and the presidency in the KRG. Otherwise, the status quo will be maintained in the region.

Saleh’s time as the KRG’s prime minister will go down as a turbulent one. His PUK lost standing in the region, which led to it losing seats in the regional parliamentary elections and protests in its base of Sulaymaniya. He was not able to reverse these trends, and gain more support for his party. Now he gives way to Nechirvan Barzani who will further entrench the KDP’s power. Rather than ushering in a new administration and new policies, Barzani will simply be more of the same.

FOOTNOTES

1. Ahmed, Hevidar, “KRG survives confidence vote,” AK News, 3/10/11

SOURCES

Abubkir, Idris, “Gorran will stay opposition in new cabinet,” AK News, 1/24/12

- “Islamic Group leader refutes confiscating govt. premises,” AK News, 2/2/11

Agence France Presse, “Top Iraq Kurd leader offers to resign amid demos,” 4/19/11

Ahmed, Hevidar, “KRG survives confidence vote,” AK News, 3/10/11

Ahmad, Zanko, “demonstrations in sulaymaniyah turn violent but protesters vow to go on,” Niqash, 4/21/11

AK News, “KRG Prime Minister responds to protesters’ demands,” AK News, 3/14/11

Alaaldin, Ranj, “Troubled times in Iraqi Kurdistan,” Guardian, 7/23/09

Ali, Ahmed, “Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: Revival or Mere Survival?” Arab Reform Bulleting, 2/24/10

Aswat al-Iraq, “Fears of potential security vacuum following US troop withdrawal,” 5/15/11

- “Kurdistan Democratic Party insists to apoint Nichervan Barzani to replace Barham Saleh,” 11/20/11

Chomani, Kamal, “Nothing New Under The Sun,” Kurdistan Tribune, 1/25/12

Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “kurdish election lists,” Niqash, 6/30/09

Hassan, Rebin, “Opposition forces leave parliament after raw with parliament speaker,” AK News, 4/4/11

Hiltermann, Joost, “Elections in Iraqi Kurdistan: Results and Implications,” International Crisis Group, 1/1/10

Human Rights Watch, “Iraqi Kurdistan: Growing Effort to Silence Media,” 5/24/11

Katzman, Kenneth, “The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq,” Congressional Research Service, 10/1/10

Knights, Michael, “’Managed Democracy’ Gives Way in Iraqi Kurdistan,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 8/3/09

Mandi, Samira Ali, “Barzani welcomed a statement on the achievements of the reform program in Kurdistan,” Radio Free Iraq, 6/15/11

Natali, Denise, “Stifled Kurdish opposition,” Middle East Channel, Foreign Policy, 2/23/11

National Iraqi News Agency, “KDP names Neijarvan Barzani for the Kurdistan Regional Government Premiership,” 1/16/12

Rudaw, “Source: Salih To Serve As Prime Minister Until 2013,” 6/15/11

Saifaddin, Dilshad, “Protesters dissatisdied with Kurdistan authority vows, says council,” AK News, 3/21/11

Stansfield, Gareth, “Can the Unified Regional Government Work?” Arab Reform Bulletin, June 2006

CNN VIDEO: Iraqis Outraged U.S. Continues To Fly Drones Over Iraq

2012-01-31T07:28:00.001-08:00

CNN FAREED ZAKARIA GPS VIDEO: The War In Iraq: Was It Worth It?

2012-01-31T07:28:00.000-08:00

Iraqi National Movement Ends Its Boycott In Face Of Possible Break-Up Of Party

2012-01-30T07:28:00.004-08:00

Iraqi Natonal Movement spokeswoman Maysoun al-Damlouji announcing the end of the list's boycott of parliament (Reuters)

The Iraqi National Movement (INM) gave up on its boycott of parliament after a meeting on January 29, 2012. Official spokesmen said the decision was made to improve the political atmosphere in the country, and to prepare the way for a planned national conference. Behind the scenes one leader anonymously said that the real reason was that the list was about to break-up if it continued on with its course of action. The party was deeply divided over not attending the legislature and the cabinet. The hopes for a successful meeting of national leaders is also not likely to resolve anything either. That shows that the National Movement has overplayed its hand once again due to its bad leadership.

On January 28, 2012, the major leaders of the Iraqi National Movement (INM) met to discuss their stance towards the government. Those in attendance included Iyad Allawi, Speaker of Parliament Osama Nujafi, Finance Minister Rafi Issawi, and Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq. The major topic of discussion was whether they would maintain their boycott of parliament. At first, the list denied that it would return to the legislature, but the next day it revealed that it actually would. The official explanation was that they wanted to help with the planned national conference of the country’s leaders, which is supposed to work out all of the political differences between the major parties. One senior leader however, told Reuters that it was because the list was about to break-up if it didn’t change direction. The main players within the INM had different positions on how to deal with their problems with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Allawi and Vice President Tariq Hashemi were for leaving the government, and moving into the opposition. Speaker Nujafi and Jamal Karbuli, who leads the Solution Movement within the INM felt that they should stay part of the national coalition, and Deputy Premier Mutlaq was split between the two sides. At the beginning of January, six members of the National Movement also attended parliament, and were kicked out of the INM as a result. The list has always been a large and unwieldy collection of parties. Maliki was able to play upon these differences when putting the government together by giving many of the individual leaders positions within the government to buy them off, while excluding Allawi. The boycott was also ineffective, because the INM did not have enough seats to stop parliament from having a quorum to conduct business. Important laws like the 2012 budget were coming up as well, which all parties will benefit from as they run ministries that they use to dole out patronage and projects to their followers. All together, this put tremendous pressure upon the National Movement to give up its boycott.

The Iraqi National Movement is supposed to have another meeting to decide what to do with not attending the cabinet. That has been poorly followed by the list, with up to five of the nine INM ministers attending the cabinet at one time or another. Again, the ministers hold actual power with large staffs and budgets to administer. Those were too much for the majority of INM members to give up, and thus they went to sessions of the cabinet despite the directions of their list. That boycott is likely to collapse officially as well.

Finally, the hopes of a successful conference are disappearing with every day. On January 27 for example, Moqtada al-Sadr said he would not attend, because he was a religious figure, not a politician. Allawi has called for all of the major leaders to be there, so this was another major setback. Not only that, but there is no reason for Maliki to compromise if the meeting ever takes place. The INM does not have the votes to hold a no confidence vote against him, they do not have the seats in parliament to stop it from holding a quorum, and half the INM ministers are showing up to the cabinet anyway. The National Movement simply does not have any leverage in this dispute with Maliki.

The Iraqi National Movement ended up winning the most seats in the 2010 parliamentary elections, but has been consistently outmaneuvered since then. Its major leaders were each given top positions in the new government, and left Allawi out in the cold hoping for a committee to be formed, which he would lead, but that has been completely dropped. Since then, Allawi has been left to constantly snipe at Maliki, while he barely attends parliament, and spends large amounts of time outside the country. This latest crisis was badly played by the list once again. Its responses to Mailiki’s call for a no confidence vote against Deputy Premier Mutlaq and the arrest warrant for Vice President Hashemi have been completely ineffective. Not only that, but they have shown how deeply divided and fragile the list is. That has left Maliki in the enviable position of simply waiting out the crisis knowing full well that the INM could not keep up its tactics, and in this case, would likely come out even weaker than before. The final episode of this drama has not been played out, but it shows that the party may do better without following Allawi and Mutlaq the next time something like this happen, which it definitely will given the personal animosities amongst Iraq’s leading politicians.

SOURCES

AIN, “Majority of IS members supports withdraw from Government,” 1/26/12

- “MP rules out IS withdrawal from political process,” 1/26/12

Mardini, Ramzy, “Iraq’s Post-Withdrawal Crisis, Update 6,” Institute for the Study of War, 1/27/12

National Iraq News Agency, “BREAKING NEWS Iraqiya decides that its law makers attend Parliament’s session to debate the Budge, General Amnesty Law,” 1/28/12

Al-Salhy, Suadad, “Iraq’s Sunni-backed bloc faces key decision,” Reuters, 1/25/12

- “Iraq’s Sunni-backed bloc to end parliament boycott,” Reuters, 1/29/12

Al-Shummari, Yazn, “Where? Not bothered really – no red lines for Allawi on conference location,” AK News, 1/17/12

Sowell, Kirk, “Inside Iraqi Politics No. 31,” 1/25/12

PRESS TV VIDEO: Iraqiya party ends parliament boycott

2012-01-30T07:28:00.003-08:00

AP VIDEO: Bomb Kills Dozens At Iraq Funeral Procession

2012-01-30T07:28:00.002-08:00

AP VIDEO: Insurgents Kill 7 Police In Iraq

2012-01-30T07:28:00.001-08:00

REUTERS VIDEO: Bomb Blast Strikes Iraq

2012-01-30T07:28:00.000-08:00